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VICTIMIZATION AS A DEFENSE: VALID
PROTECTION FOR THE INNOCENT OR ESCAPE
FROM CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?
At the core of our criminal justice system are safeguards and
protections for a defendant accused of a crime.' To ensure that
those not responsible for their actions are not punished, states
See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be put twice in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment also subjected states to due
process, stating:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to .any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). In Katz, the FBI taped the defendant's
phone conversation while the defendant was on a public payphone. Id. at 358. Statements
from this conversation were introduced into evidence and the defendant was eventually
convicted. Id. The government had wiretapped the phone without first getting a warrant.
Id. at 359. Since a "search and seizure warrant" is used to safeguard citizens' constitutional
rights, the Court held that wiretapping without obtaining the proper warrant was improper
and a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 357-59; Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 437 (1966). Miranda primarily dealt with the constitutional rights to which a
criminal suspect is entitled. Id. at 439. The Court stated that "[t]he cases before us raise
questions which go to the root of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the
restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting indi-
viduals for a crime." Id. The Court specifically set forth the warnings to be-given a suspect
before any interrogation may begin. Id. at 444-45. "The warning of the right to remain
silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court." Id. at 469. "[Aln individual held for interrogation must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate to-
day." Id. at 471. "[Ilt is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult
with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him." Id. at 473. "[T]his warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation." Id. at 471.
"No amount of circumstantial evidence . . . will suffice [as] . . . assurance that the accused
was aware of this right." Id. at 471-72.; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Mapp
extended the obligation to safeguard a citizen's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights to the states. Id. Essentially, the Court held that the states are also required
to adhere to the same "exclusionary rule" for Fourth Amendment violations that federal
courts follow. Id.
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have developed statutes providing for insanity and justification de-
fenses.2 Despite these laws, there is little sympathy in a court of
law for an individual accused of murder. However, when the de-
fendant has been the subject of victimization,' sympathy can po-
tentially play a significant role in the trial process.4 Although
some critics believe that it is too easy to assert victimization as an
excuse for criminal behavior, others believe that allowing evi-
dence of victimization serves to rebut any assumption of criminal
intent. 5
As more became known about instances of victimization, de-
fendants introduced their experiences as victims in support of a
defense to murder.6 The majority of battered women and chil-
' See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.330 (1992) (Justification: Use of Non-Deadly Force in
Defense of Self); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.404 (1992) (Justification; Self-Defense); LA.
CODE CRIM. PRoC. ANN. art. 657 (West 1992) (Insanity Proceedings); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 101 (West 1992) (Defenses and Affirmative Defenses; Justification); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05 (1991) (Justification - Excuse - Affirmative Defenses); ND. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05-03 (1991) (Affirmative Defense, Self-Defense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.77.020 (West Supp. 1992) (Criminally Insane - Procedures); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE art. 3 (discussing principles of justification); id. art. 4 (discussing defense of mental
disease). But see Christine A. Gardner, Post Partum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting
Away With Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953, 982 (1990) (discussing some states' abolition
of insanity defense).
3 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2550 (1986). "Victimization" is
defined as "[t]he act or process of victimizing or the state of being victimized." Id. A "vic-
tim" is defined as "[a] person subjected to deprivation, or suffering" or "anyone who suf-
fers ... incidentally." Id. As a result, it is submitted that victimization includes individuals
suffering from both mental and physical disabilities which affect their state of mind.
' See Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf
of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 18 (1986). Justification defenses deem
behavior otherwise criminal as acceptable to society. Id. According to the author, "[tihe
conduct is paradigmatically wrong but, due to compelling circumstances and proper mo-
tive, the case is exceptional and the conduct should not be punished." Id. The act is accept-
able to society because the extreme circumstances under which it was committed neutralize
its criminality by removing the criminal component of the act. Id. Therefore, an exception
to the criminal law is warranted. Id. For a justification defense to be successful, it must
comply with certain requirements and only then will the criminal prohibitions against it be
disregarded. Id. at 18-19; see also infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text (discussing sym-
pathetic effect on jury of evidence of previous victimization of defendant).
' See infra notes 37-52 and accompanying text (discussing how victimization as defense is
implemented and its various criticisms).
6 See, e.g., People v. Weinstein, 1992 WL 365725, at *1 (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. 1992).
In Weinstein, the defendant allegedly killed his wife by strangulation. Id. The defendant
claimed that he lacked the requisite mental capacity for a conviction because of a cyst lo-
cated in the frontal lobe of his brain which altered his mental state. Id. The court allowed
expert testimony concerning various medical tests such as the positron emission tomogra-
phy test ("PET") and the skin conductance response test ("SCR"). Id. at *1-2. PET was
used to allow experts to make evaluations as to the metabolic functioning of the defend-
ant's various brain regions. Id. at *2. SCR was used to evaluate whether lesions in the
frontal lobe were present. Id. at *3. However, the court held that the defendant's condi-
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dren have been able to establish that their status as abused per-
sons 7 bears directly on the issue of imminent harm in support of a
self-defense claim.' People suffering from post partum depression9
tion did not pass the test of admissibility. Id. at *1; cf. Poblet v. Parisi, 130 Misc. 2d 521,
522, 496 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985). Poblet dealt with a plaintiff
suing to recover for "post-traumatic neurosis syndrome which she claimed was a result of a
car accident." Id. The plaintiff suffered from nightmares, insomnia, anxiety, fear of situa-
tions similar to that in which her car accident took place, lack of concentration, undue
residual stress, apprehension, and fearfulness. Id. The court held that the syndrome, which
was claimed to be of a psychiatric and/or psychological origin, was "highly subjective in
nature." Id. at 939. As a result, the majority did not accept the syndrome as an "injury"
for which plaintiff could recover. Id.; see also Anne D. Brusca, Post Partum Psychosis: A Way
Out For Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1135 (1990) (discussing unsuccessful
attempts at using post partum depression, pre-menstrual syndrome, XYY chromosome, andjunk food diet defenses to negate evidence of criminal state of mind); Diana J. Ensign,
Links Between the Battered Woman Syndrome and the Battered Child Syndrome: An Argument for
Consistent Standards in the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Family Abuse Cases, 36 WAYNE L.
REV. 1619, 1625 (1990) (discussing battered woman and battered child syndromes as de-
fenses); Gardner, supra note 2, at 976-77 (discussing post partum depression and pre-men-
strual syndrome, with their ability to alter one's state of mind, as defenses to murder);
Jennifer L. Grossman, Post Partum Psychosis - A Defense to Criminal Responsibility or Just
Another Gimmick?, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 311, 333-43 (1990) (detailing failed attempts using
post partum depression and pre-menstrual syndrome as defenses to murder and success of
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as defense to murder due to its acceptance in medical
field); Maureen Balleza, A New Mental Disorder Appears in Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1992, at D16. Three children died from either a heart attack or an overdose of medication
while under a woman's care. Id. Although the woman has not yet been charged, it is sus-
pected that she suffers from "Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy." Id. This syndrome
causes either parents, or those entrusted with the care of a child, to cause that child to
become ill so the guardian can get the "sympathy and attention they gain from others and
for the sense of control they gain from caring for a sick child." Id..
' See Scott L. Feld & Murray A. Straus, Escalation and Desistance of Wife Assault in Mar-
riage, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 141, 141 (1989) (stating majority of couples nationwide experience
incidents of assault during marriage); Gardner, supra note 2, at 983 n.245. "The National
Center on Child Abuse and Neglect study for the year extending from May 1, 1979 to
April 30, 1980, estimated 652,000 cases of child abuse and neglect in the United States."
Id. (citations omitted). In 1985, over 1.9 million children were reported as victims of abuse.
Id. at 983-84. Incidents of child abuse resulting in fatalities rose in 1986. Id. at 984 n.250(citations omitted); Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right?: The Battered Wo-
man Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1255 n.13
(1987). Abuse, which can include a slap as well as a severe beating, is common among the
majority of American couples. Id. (citations omitted). It is estimated that 4.7 million woman
are badly battered each year. Id.; see also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1(1982) (estimating that there are over one million battered wives in this country and that
one out of three marriages experiences spousal violence); JANET ROSENBERG, 911 - FAMILY
VIOLENCE: HELPING THE VICTIM 65 (1986). According to FBI statistics, one-fourth of all
murders occur within the family. Id.; DANIEL J. SONKIN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 98
(1987) (indicating that intimate relationships have higher risk of injury than violence on
streets); Mary Suh, Understanding Battered Women, Ms., Apr. 1989, at 63. It has been re-
ported that in a single year as many as 1.8 million men beat their wives. Id.; Anne Sum-
mers, The Hedda Conundrum, Ms., Apr. 1989, at 54 (revealing that "more than three peo-
ple die a day as a result of abuse and neglect").
' See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text (discussing battering syndromes and their
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and acute grief syndrome10 have also attempted to advance the
proposition that their affliction altered their mental state, result-
ing in actions for which they should not be held accountable."
This Note will explore the various types of victimization de-
fenses which defendants have introduced to be released from cul-
pability. It will first discuss the battered woman and battered child
syndromes and their relevance to a valid self-defense claim when
an abused person kills his or her attacker. It will assert that the
admission of expert testimony on these syndromes neither violates
nor expands the traditional standards of self-defense. Next, this
Note will discuss cases of post partum depression and acute grief
syndrome, where lack of mental culpability has also been sug-
gested as a defense to murder. Finally, this Note concludes that
because sufficient medical knowledge of the latter two conditions
is lacking, a functional legal defense cannot be formulated without
opening the door to rampant abuse.
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULES OF SELF-DEFENSE AS APPLIED TO THE
BATTERED WOMAN AND BATTERED CHILD SYNDROMES
Many victims of abuse who kill their abusers assert a claim of
self-defense. 2 Self-defense permits a person to use necessary force
use as defense).
I See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing post partum depression and its
use as defense to murder).
1" See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (discussing acute grief syndrome and
its use as defense to murder).
" See State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 800 (Idaho 1969) (mother who killed infant child
asserted insanity due to post partum depression as defense and was acquitted); Common-
wealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (mother drowned infant son
and asserted insanity defense based on post partum depression resulting in guilty but men-
tally ill verdict); see also People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d 681, 682, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973
(Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1992) (defendant tried to introduce expert testimony on "acute grief"
syndrome to show trauma and extreme stress led to his alleged untruthful confession); Peo-
ple v. Shelton, 88 Misc. 2d 136, 142-47, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 712-16 (Sup. Ct. New York
Cty. 1976), af'd, 78 A.2d 821, 434 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1980) (evidence of "extreme
emotional disturbance" allowed as mitigating factor in murder trial).
12 See State v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (battered woman
killed husband after 48 hours of abuse was permitted to offer evidence of battered woman
syndrome in support of self-defense); State v. Hennum, 4"41 N.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Minn.
1989) (battered woman killed husband in sleep after hours of brutal abuse and asserted
self-defense); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ohio 1990) (battered woman shot and
killed husband and asserted self-defense); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App.
1992) (battered woman shot husband as he moved for her and asserted self-defense); see
also Mark Hansen, Battered Child's Defense, A.BA. J., May 1992, at 28, 28 (discussing acquit-
tal on parricide charges against abused seventeen year old girl); David Margolick, When
Child Kills Parent, It's Sometimes to Survive, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1992, at D20. In 1992, for
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to protect him or herself from harm."3 A successful self-defense
claim must pass a two prong test.' 4 First, the defendant must
prove that he or she had a reasonable belief that grave bodily in-
jury was imminent. 5 Second, the defendant must show that physi-
cal force was essential to avert the threatened injury."
A battering relationship does not consist solely of isolated inci-
dents of beatings." Generally, a couple goes through a cycle 8
which consists of three phases: a period where tension escalates
between the abuser and his victim, leading to a period of actual
the first time in this country, the Washington Court of Appeals recognized the battered
child syndrome as a factor in determining guilt in a murder case. Id. The murder convic-
tion of a boy who killed his stepfather was overturned specifically for the reason that the
jury was not informed of the battering relationship and thus was not capable of assessing a
self-defense claim in such a situation. Id.
S See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 454, 454-57 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing use of force to protect oneself; justification); see also Rosen, supra note 4, at 27.
One has a legal right to kill in self-defense. Moreover, such intentional homicides
are encouraged because they are not harmful to society and may be beneficial. Yet
the criminal law's general goal of reducing the amount of violence in society remains
the same. To harmonize the principle that killings in self-defense are justified with
the principle that human life is the highest value protected by the law, the range of
defensive conduct that will be justified must be narrowly circumscribed.
Id.
'4 See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 13, at 454. Since there are two requirements of a
successful self-defense claim, a two prong test is inferred. Id. "The proper inquiry is not
the immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the response necessary in defense." Id.
"One who is not the aggressor.., is justified in using a reasonable amount of force against
his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful
bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this
danger." Id.
See id. at 458-59 (essence of self-defense is that bodily harm was imminent).
16 See id. at 457-58. Some jurisdictions have additional requirements for self-defense. Id.
One such example is having the defendant prove that he or she was not the initial aggres-
sor and if he or she was, that the defendant effectively withdrew from the situation. Id.
Other jurisdictions require proof that no alternative was available, such as the possibility of
retreat. Id.
"' See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (discussing battering cycle in detail); see
also Rocco C. Cipparone, Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 427, 429 (1987) (stressing that retaliation is result of years of violence and not of one
incident).
"B See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990) (accepting proposition that cycle
must occur at least two times for woman to be considered battered); Bechtel v. State, 840
P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). The Bechtel court stated: "[I]n order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman
may find herself in an abusive relationship ...once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman". Id.; see also Cipparone, supra
note 17, at 431. To be considered a battered woman, the beating incident must occur
more than once. Id. at n.27 (citations omitted). Although the exact number of times is
debatable, it has been accepted that, at a minimum, the battering must occur twice. Id. at
431.
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battering, followed by "calm, loving respite." 19 This cycle of vio-
lence leads to what is known as "learned helplessness. "' 0 Learned
helplessness is a psychosocial theory which explains why women in
this type of situation, although possessing the ability to act, re-
main passive and nonresponsive."1
Battered children also become convinced that they are help-
less.22 Like the battered woman, the battered child has "a special
feeling of imminence-he or she has to live with the [abuser]."2 3
The child believes that unless he or she acts, the abuse will even-
tually result in his or her death. " The child feels a sense of help-
1* See Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 8. "A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man to coerce her to do something
he wants her to do without any concern for her rights. Id. Battered women include wives
or women in any . . . intimate relationship with men." Id.; see also LENORE WALKER, THE
BA'rERED WOMAN 55-63 (1979). Domestic violence occurs in cycles with three phases. Id. at
55. The first phase has been termed "the tension building phase," where the man only
mildly abuses his wife. Id. at 56. During this phase, victims of the abuse contemplate leav-
ing and in some instances, have actually tried to leave but most, nevertheless, remain with
their batterers. Id. The second phase, where fatal violence is likely to occur, involves an
"acute battering incident." Id. at 59. At this point, the woman is mostly concerned with
surviving the beatings instead of leaving the relationship, and her behavior is considered
"learned helplessness." Id. at 60. The third and final stage is one of calm. Id. at 65. As a
result of the victim's learned helplessness, her hope that the relationship is salvageable, and
her love for her abuser, she will probably succumb to her abuser's empty promises of reha-
bilitation. Id. at 68. Nonetheless, and contrary to the her hopes, the cycle reoccurs to the
woman's detriment. Id. at 69. However, the next time the tension phase will be more abu-
sive and the contrition period will be less meaningful. Id.
o See WALKER, supra note 19, at 43. In explaining "learned helplessness," Dr. Walker
stated that a battered woman commonly experiences severe stress reactions such as anxiety,
depression, fear, and general suspiciousness. Id. The battered woman also believes that no
one can help resolve her predicament and thus feels completely helpless. Id.
" See Mihajlovich, supra note 7, at 1258. Experiments on rats and dogs showed that
when "continuous negative stimuli" was administered, the animals developed a feeling of
powerlessness and thus became "compliant, passive and submissive." Id. (quoting Dr. Le-
nore Walker). Dr. Walker claims that women in a battering situation tend to act the same
way. Id. "They believe they are helpless and this belief becomes their reality." Id. "[They]
allow what they perceive to become beyond their control, [and] therefore, they do not
attempt to escape the battering relationship." Id.
" See Nancy Blodgett, Self-Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual Abuse as Justification,
A.B.A. J., June 1987, at 36, 36. "Well over 90 percent of the kids who kill their parents are
physically, emotionally or sexually abused." Id. "The majority of youths who commit parri-
cide have also attempted suicide within six months of their murder." Id. at 37; see also
Gardner, supra note 2, at 983-84. Despite Congress's attempts to protect children from
abuse and neglect through legislation, incidents of child abuse rose during the 1980s. Id. at
983. This was compounded by the fact that charges of child abuse and neglect are rarely
prosecuted. Id. at n.252. Even when agencies are informed of the abuse, they tend not to
pursue prosecution. Id. at 984 n.254.
13 Blodgett, supra note 22, at 37 (asserting that children commit parricide because they
cannot escape abusive home life).
"' See id. at 36 (discussing how children kill because they are convinced no one is going
to help); see also Marcia Chambers, Children Citing Self-Defense in Murder of Parents, N.Y.
[Vol. 8:305
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lessness similar to that of a battered woman, in that acting with
deadly force seems to be the only possible escape. 5
The rebirth of the women's movement in the 1960s brought
national recognition to problems of domestic violence and, as a
result, the battered woman and battered child syndromes have
been legally acknowledged as support for a self-defense claim to
murder.?
In many cases, self-defense can be successfully asserted without
evidence of either the battered woman or battered child syn-
dromes. 7 However, when a victim kills either after the violence
has ceased or when imminent danger is no longer apparent, a
claim of self-defense is more troublesome.18 In this situation, the
TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1986, at 38. "[D]efense lawyers are now more likely to mount a vigorous
and often highly publicized defense based on the idea that battered children, like battered
wives, reach a point where their fear of being killed becomes unbearable and they kill in
self-defense." Id.
8 See Blodgett, supra note 22, at 36. The author explains that a child acts out of fear
that he or she will be murdered at some point. Id. The author quoted a Long Island, New
York lawyer, Paul Gianelli, who stated "I sense the community can appreciate the helpless-
ness a child feels when he or she is put in a situation by a parent where death feels like the
only alternative." Id. at 37.
24 See Ensign, supra note 6, at 1621-22. "Although wife battering is not a new phenome-
non, it has grown more visible due to feminists who brought the issue to the public's atten-
tion." Id.; Rosen, supra note 4, at 12. "Probably as a result of the rebirth of the women's
movement in the 1960s, national attention once again has focused on the problems of do-
mestic violence." Id.; see also Chambers, supra note 24, at 38 (child abuse is emerging as
viable defense to parricide); Margolick, supra note 12, at Al. "Maybe we've jumped that
hurdle of being able to show to a jury and a community that a child cannot endure years
and years of severe emotional, physical and sexual abuse and not be expected to defend
herself at some point." Id. (quoting Bryan Johnson, defense attorney in Tyler, Texas).
"7 See Cipparone, supra note 17, at 432-33 (in many instances, self-defense is successful
excuse for action); see also Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 5 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). The
imminence requirement was satisfied because the husband moved towards the wife. Id.
Also, because the beatings were life-threatening, the requirement of serious injury was
met. Id. at 4. But see People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (immi-
nence not apparent since husband was killed in sleep and thus, evidence regarding battered
woman syndrome was necessary); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Minn. 1989)
(same); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ohio 1990) (since husband killed after violence
ceased, battered woman testimony was essential to defense); Margolick, supra note 13, at
D20.
For claims of self-defense to be upheld ... the law has generally required a reasona-
ble fear of imminent deadly harm. Courts and juries have found that element lack-
ing in the killing of husbands or parents, for battered women and children often
ambush their targets or kill them while they are asleep.
Id.
28 See Rosen, supra note 4, at 13. Self-defense is not as justified where imminent danger
is not apparent. Id. These types of cases "do not fit neatly into the categories of good and
evil created by the criminal justice system." Id. Simply put, murder is not condoned unless
it is justified. Id. Sometimes, the killing will be clearly justified, as when the woman retali-
ates during an acute battering incident. d. However, the woman often reacts with deadly
1992]
ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
imminence requirement for a valid self-defense claim, on its face,
seems to be lacking) 9
As more scientific knowledge of the battered woman and child
syndromes emerged,30 it became possible to overcome the myths
associated with the syndromes and to better understand the bat-
tered person's perception of reality.31 Evidence of the syndromes
has become relevant to the establishment of a sincere belief by the
battered person that bodily injury would ensue in a situation
where one not affected by the syndrome would not possess such a
force when she probably would not have been killed during the attack or simply in re-
sponse to "verbal threats unaccompanied by any contemporaneous overt physical aggres-
sion." Id. at 14.
29 See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 324 P.2d 933, 936 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). The Lucas court
stated that although harm was threatened, if it was not supported by the threatener's abil-
ity to follow through, imminence was not present. Id. "[Tlhreats alone, unaccompanied by
some act which induces in defendant a reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be
inflicted, do not justify a homicide." Id.; see also Wilson, 487 N.W.2d at 823 (questioning
imminence when wife killed husband in sleep); Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 801 ("substantial
grounds exist which tend to excuse or mitigate [defendant's] culpability, although it does
not amount to a defense"); Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974 (history of physical abuse contributes
to state of mind and perception of imminent danger); Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 5 (victim must be
threatened with severe force at moment she kills attacker); Cipparone, supra note 17, at
437. "[T~he threatened harm might never occur, and even if it does, it might not rise to a
level justifying the use of deadly force in response." Id. "Accordingly, a defendant . . .
must show that death or serious bodily injury was imminent at the particular instant at
which the killing occurred." Id. See generally Susan Estrich, Book Note, Defending Women,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1432 (1990) (reviewing CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE:
BATTERED WOMEN, SELF DEFENSE AND THE LAW (1989)). "The hard question in self-defense
cases, however, is not whether it will suffice for a woman to use less force than her male
attacker; it is whether she is privileged to use more, to use deadly force when he may not."
Id.; Leslie Malkin, Book Note, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 623, 625 (1992) (reviewing GILLESPIE,
supra). "[Tihe requirement of imminent danger is often what poses the largest roadblock
to the battered woman's use of self-defense in a trial." Id.; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal
Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 623,
634 (1980). "Homicides committed by battered women frequently occur with a time lag,
while the man is asleep or while his back is turned." Id. This poses obstacles to the
women's self-defense claim. Id.
"o See WALKER, supra note 19, at 242-50 (discussing medical acceptance of battering syn-
dromes and steps medical and psychiatric professions are taking to prevent domestic
violence).
" See Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing expert testimony
needed to "dispel ... perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at
any time," further explaining why women stay despite repeated abuse); Wilson, 487
N.W.2d at 824 (discussing need to dispel common misconceptions concerning child's be-
havior following sexual abuse); Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973. "In determining whether the de-
fendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger, you
must put yourself in the position of the defendant, with her characteristics, knowledge, or
lack of knowledge, and under the same circumstances and conditions that surrounded the
defendant at the time." Id.; Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 8. "Misconceptions regarding battered
woman abound, making it more likely than not that the average juror will draw from his or
her own experience or common myths, which may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion."
Id.
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belief.82 Thus, evidence of the syndromes has been utilized in the
majority of jurisdictions to prove lack of mental culpability, 8 and
to establish self-defense when a battered person kills his or her
abuser.3 4 However, critics argue that these victimization defenses
", See Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 977 (although battered woman may have valid self-defense
claim, nonbattered woman would not); Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 8. "Expert testimony ... is
admissible if it will assist the trier of fact in search of the truth and augment the normal
experience of the juror by helping him or her draw proper conclusions concerning particu-
lar behavior of a victim in a particular circumstance or circumstances." Id.; see also In re
Meyer, 132 Misc. 2d 415, 418, 504 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Fam. Ct. Kings Cty. 1986). "[B]oth
the legislature and the courts have broadened the rules of evidence in child protective
proceedings to permit the trial court to receive relevant evidence which would not be ad-
missible in other litigations." Id.
33 See, e.g., Dunn, 963 F.2d at 313. In Dunn, a battered woman asserted that her afflic-
tion with the battered woman syndrome prevented her from having the requisite mental
intent to commit the crime of aiding and abetting her husband in a felony. Id.; Ex. rel.
Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326, 327 (W. Va. 1988). In Betty J.W., the mother of five children
was charged with "knowingly allowing" another person, her husband, to abuse their chil-
dren. Id. The mother offered evidence of the battered woman's syndrome to rebut the
presumption that she condoned the behavior by not leaving immediately. Id. at 332. The
court stated that the battered woman's syndrome did not relieve the defendant of obliga-
tion, but did suffice to show that waiting until her husband was away to remove the chil-
dren was reasonable. Id.; see also United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d 899, 905 (9th Cir.
1992). Although the battered woman's syndrome was deemed not to have influenced the
defendant-wife in abetting her husband in a crime, the court did acknowledge that under
certain circumstances, the battered woman syndrome is relevant to the charges of aiding
and abetting. Id.; Daniel Wise, Sentence Reduction Given Abused Woman, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23,
1992, at 1. A Brooklyn judge reduced a battered woman's sentence for possession of co-
caine with intent to distribute to the minimum of 60 months. Id. In doing so, he stated that
a departure from strict adherence to sentencing is authorized "when [it] 'hinder[s]' the
objective of providing a 'just punishment for the offense.' " Id. (quoting Judge Jack B.
Weinstein,, in United States v. Gaviria, CR89-901, United States District Court, E.D.N.Y.,
Oct. 22, 1992). "The guidelines ... do not promote 'just punishment' because they fail to
take account of the 'endemic sociological and psychological realities' facing 'subservient
women.' " Id. "Such women .. . 'deserve less punishment than the usual defendant when
the man orders her to commit a crime and she obeys.' " Id.;Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991,
1043 (Wyo. 1984) (admitting expert testimony on history of abuse of parricide defendant
to explain how battered children perceive imminence).
" See, e.g., Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (evidence
of abuse admitted to support self-defense); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981)
(evidence of battered woman syndrome admitted); State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475, 475
(Kan. 1985) (evidence of battered woman syndrome admitted to support self-defense); May
v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 784 (Miss. 1985) (evidence of abuse admitted to demonstrate
battered woman syndrome); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (allowed expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome for self-defense); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d
129, 131, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1985) (testimony regarding battered
woman syndrome admitted); Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 970-71 (expert testimony admitted to sup-
port battered wife's claim of self-defense); see also Joelle A. Moreno, Killing Daddy: Develop-
ing a Self-Defense Strategy for the Abused Child, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1297 (1989). The
author discusses in detail two parricide cases where testimony concerning previous abuse
was admitted. Id. In the first, a teenage boy tried on many occasions to kill his father. Id.
He was subsequently charged with attempted murder and acquitted after six weeks of testi-
mony regarding the physical and sexual abuse the boy was forced to endure from his fa-
ther. Id. at 1298. The second depicts the case of a boy who killed his legal guardian. Id.
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provide the defendant with an easy "excuse" to avoid the serious-
ness of the crime committed."
A. Theory of Excuse
Those who believe the admission of syndrome evidence should
be barred argue that such practice not only stretches traditional
self-defense concepts beyond their common law and statutory
meanings, but also permits an acquittal where one would not oth-
erwise be had. 6 These critics reject the notion that a battered
person's behavior is rooted in self-defense, and argue that it is
simply an excuse in the guise of justification."'
Our criminal law provides specific defenses to protect those
Testimony and evidence of previous beatings was allowed, but the jury convicted him any-
way. Id. However, the jury did ask the judge for leniency in sentencing, and the boy was
sentenced to one year probation and a $1,000 fine. Id.; Hansen, supra note 12, at 28 (dis-
cussing Texas case which allowed evidence of previous abuse of defendant-daughter by
father in father's murder trial); Margolick, supra note 12, at D20 (discussing case overturn-
ing murder conviction of abused stepson). But see Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982) (evidence of battered woman syndrome properly excluded in effort to
prove self-defense because deceased's threats were insufficient to lead defendant to form
reasonable belief of imminent danger); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988)
("There is no exception to this requirement [imminent danger] where the defendant has
suffered long-term domestic abuse and the victim is the abuser."); State v. Martin, 666
S.W.2d 895, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (fact that defendant was subject to past abuse was
irrelevant if no imminent danger); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989) (evi-
dence of abuse was properly excluded where there was no imminent danger).
U See infra notes 36-37, 39, & 41-42 (discussing theory of excuse).
See Rosen, supra note 4, at 15 n.18.
The battered wife syndrome defense violates the existing criminal law by seeking to
avoid the requirement of imminent present danger of death or great bodily harm
and substituting certainty of future harm plus inadequacies of legitimate alternatives
rationale, thereby bestowing upon the abused wife the unique right to destroy her
tormentor at her own discretion.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Estrich, supra note 29, at 1437. "I am not ready to abandon
the requirements of self-defense . . . .Admitting evidence of past batterings and expert
testimony of Battered Woman's Syndrome may not move us to try walking in that woman's
shoes, but at least it tells us more about the person we are judging." Id.
3' See Rosen, supra note 4, at 22. "[E]xcuse focuses on the actor's subjective perceptions.
An excused actor has committed a harmful act that the criminal. law seeks to prevent. Un-
like a justified act, the excused act did not avoid a greater societal harm or further a
greater societal interest." Id. The actor is still not liable because the manner in which it
was committed does not'satisfy the components deemed necessary to be criminal-mainly a
vindictive or guilty mind. Id. "The actor is excused despite the harmful act because, due to
internal or external pressure, [he or she] was not morally blameworthy." Id. The crime was
committed in a manner and under such circumstances that the excused "did not have a fair
opportunity to choose meaningfully whether to inflict the harm." Id. Because the law
presumes free will, one who cannot make a conscious decision as to whether to obey or
violate the law is not a proper individual for criminal punishment. Id. As a result, excuses
apply only when the conduct in question was mostly a result of "coercive influences." Id.
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lacking criminal intent.8" Therefore, while the law recognizes that
battered women and children do not satisfy the statutory defini-
tion of possessing a criminal mind, it is debated whether they
should be entitled to a complete justification defense.89 Critics
enumerate potential problems if such defendants are afforded a
valid self-defense claim.40 They fear that such an expansion of
self-defense will encourage self-help and the use of force in re-
venge, and thereby open the door for abuse. 41 These opponents
contend that, ultimately, there will be an undesirable extension of
the laws of self-defense to anyone who believes in his or her mind
that deadly force is necessary. 4' Finally, critics claim that the law
would be condoning the use of more violence than the actor was
threatened with, which is, in and of itself, against the traditional
rules of self-defense. 43
U See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional protections for de-
fendants lacking criminal intent).
" See Rosen, supra note 4, at 33-45. In discussing a theory of excuse versus a valid justifi-
cation defense, the author notes:
Principles of excuse have become merged with principles of justification in the law
of self-defense. Consequently, results in some cases are illogical and inconsistent with
basic principles of criminal law. The problem is particularly apt to arise when de-
mands are made to justify self-help behavior that is harmful to society in instances
where the actor cannot fairly be held blameworthy because of circumstances particu-
lar to that individual.
Id. at 45.
"0 See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing potential problems of allowing
defense supported by syndrome).
' See Rosen, supra note 4, at 15. "Much of the debate concerns the potential impact the
defense may have on the ability of the criminal law to deter battered women [and children]
from engaging in unnecessary self-help or from killing in revenge or retaliation." Id.;
Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1004-08 (Wyo. 1984). In fear of promoting the use of self-
help, the court refused to allow psychiatric testimony on the effect of long-term abuse on
the defendant's perception of danger on the night he murdered his parent. Id.
is See Rosen, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing possibility of undesirable extension of self-
defense); Mihajlovich, supra note 7, at 1263-69 (discussing how allowing testimony on bat-
tering syndromes is problematic); Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1004-08 (rejecting subjective ap-
proach in child abuse case because beyond traditional self-defense standards).
"' See Estrich, supra note 29, at 1430. "[T]hese women responded not only with vio-
lence, but with greater violence. [There] are cases in which abused women killed their
husbands, are tried for murder, and plead self-defense. And mostly, they fail." Id.; Rosen,
supra note 4, at 13. When battered women kill it is often difficult to judge imminent dan-
ger. Id. Despite the battered woman's previous victimization, her perception of the danger
at the time of the murder may have been distorted. Id. The woman may have perceived
that the harm was deadly, when it really was not. Id.; see alsoJahnke, 682 P.2d at 1008. The
court refused to acknowledge a self-defense claim for parricide by holding "whoever pur-
posely and with premeditated malice . . . kills any human being is guilty of murder." Id.
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B. Subjective Approach
Although there are potential problems with admitting syn-
drome evidence, a plausible solution exists. Even though criminal
law tends to be overinclusive, it need not approach admission of
the syndromes on an all or nothing basis. Therefore, while this
Note does not suggest that the mere evidence of prior abuse will
exculpate a defendant, it is suggested that due to the uniqueness
of a battered person's position, a subjective approach would serve
the defendant's needs, while simultaneously furthering the goals
of the law. Implementing a subjective approach as some courts al-
ready do, would enlighten the jury as to the abuser's course of
conduct in similar situations.44
By invoking the subjective standard, the law is neither ex-
panding the traditional laws of self-defense, nor creating an ex-
cuse for acquittal. The subjective approach merely provides the
jury with a complete understanding of the situation to accurately
assess the presence of imminent danger.' Therefore, the pivotal
"" See WALKER, supra note 19, at 73. Despite the frequency of the battering incidents, an
abused person may not know that a specific beating is imminent. Id. However, Dr. Walker
reports that once the beating begins, all battered persons are well aware that the beating
can be fatal. Id. at 75; supra notes 18-22, 46 and accompanying text (discussing how bat-
tering incidents happen in reoccurring cycles and how battered person perceives imminent
danger). But see State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 977 (Ohio 1990). The court suggested that
to invoke a subjective standard is to provide the battered woman with an excuse and not a
justification defense. Id. The majority stated that the defendant responded to both external
and internal pressures, for which she was not responsible but which "were created by her
social reality as a battered woman." Id. The court further noted that, although a battered
woman was not to blame for her conduct, a woman who did not suffer from the syndrome
would be culpable under identical circumstances. Id.; Rosen, supra note 4, at 18-19. The
author notes:
Each justification defense is defined by a particular set of circumstances under which
it is appropriate to disregard the criminal law's prohibition against acting. The law
assumes that, when the circumstances that define the justification exist, the defend-
ant has accomplished a socially desirable objective by committing the act or, at least
has not harmed society.
Id. Thus, justified conduct is desired and encouraged. Id at 19. "In a situation of conflict,
the justified act is the one that should prevail." Id. Paul Robinson, "a leading proponent of
systemization of criminal defenses," has set forth three categories of justification defenses:
"lesser evils, authorized use of defensive force, and authorized use of aggressive force." Id.
at 19-20. According. to Robinson, all three categories are justified because in each, the
benefit to society is greater than the harm it causes society. Id. at 20.
" See Estrich, supra note 29, at 1436. "[R]easonableness is not an invitation to blind
ourselves to particular realities of the situation in favor of normative standards that simply
are not applicable .... [I]f we can be convinced that the woman [or child] is right, or even
probably right, then how can [his or] her belief not be reasonable?" Id. In other words,
implementing the subjective standard would allow a jury to see the reasonableness from a
battered person's perspective, whereas objectively, a nonbattered person would not per-
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question has been whether evidence of the syndromes is probative
of the defendant's reasonableness in his or her belief that he or
she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.4 6
The special subjective knowledge of the battered woman or child
has cast additional light on this inquiry."' For example, the bat-
tered person may have prior knowledge of the abuser's behavior
patterns which usually precede the abuse, and thus will know
when another beating is imminent. 8 Although normal threats of
violence will not justify the use of deadly force, threats in a bat-
tering relationship must be taken more seriously since such
threats are usually carried out.49 Therefore, if jurors are in-
structed to put themselves in the shoes of the battered person
under the same circumstances, they too may sense the presence of
imminent danger. 50 Accordingly, expert testimony regarding the
ceive such danger. Id.
46 See id. "To the extent that her experience as a battered woman, and the syndrome
from which she suffers, makes her a better judge than us of the seriousness of the situation
she actually faces, there should be no question that such evidence is not only relevant, but
also highly probative." Id. The woman and the expert may possess knowledge concerning
the risks involved in a battering relationship with which the average lay person is not famil-
iar. Id. A battered person may accurately foresee a serious beating where a nonafflicted
person would simply not recognize the danger. Id.; see also People v. Jackson, 95 Cal. Rptr.
919, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) ("the diagnosis of the 'battered child syndrome' has become
an accepted medical diagnosis"); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 70, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657,
665, 304 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1973). "[A]lthough the decision to admit such expert testimony
is within the discretion of the trial court, there is little doubt of its relevancy in [child]
prosecutions .... " Id.
'" See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing how circumstances under
which battered persons live render them able to perceive seriousness of danger where one
not afflicted may not); see also Estrich, supra note 29, at 1436 (discussing how battered
person is best judge of seriousness of attack by his or her abuser).
11 See Estrich, supra note 29, at 1436 (discussing effects of continual beatings on abused
and how abused person perceives abuser's behavior in different, and possibly more accu-
rate, light).
" See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990). The Koss court found that
"[elxpert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted to help the
jury not only understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine whether the
defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger
when considering the issue of self-defense." Id.; GILLESPIE, supra note 29, at 68 (discussing
effects of threats in battering context); see also In re Young, 50 Misc. 2d 271, 272-73, 270
N.Y.S.2d 250, 252 (Fam. Ct. Westchester Cty. 1966). "The overriding concern of the Fam-
ily Court is the abused child. If the Court is to effectively protect that child ... it is appar-
ent that rules of evidence must be adopted which will permit the Court a full inquiry into
all of the facts and circumstances .... ." Id.
"o See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989) (expert testimony allowed to
"show the reasonableness of the defendant's fear that she was in imminent peril of death
or serious bodily injury."); Estrich, supra note 29, at 1436 (evidence of previous beatings
can reveal reasonableness of defendant's perceptions); Moreno, supra note 34, at 1286.
"Battered children and women perceive, more acutely than strangers, the imminence and
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syndrome should be admissible to prove that the defendant had a
subjective belief of imminent danger.5"
II. THE NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
There are many myths concerning the circumstances surround-
ing abused victims.52 Mainly, society is unsympathetic and often
views the passive behavior of a woman as acceptance of the at-
tacks, and not a result of "learned helplessness;" thus, her predic-
ament is her own fault and not her abuser's. 53 Although similar
misconceptions exist for battered children, due to society's views
of the vulnerability of children, their helplessness is more easily
degree of danger at the hands of their abusers. Victims of continued abuse 'become at-
tuned to stages of violence . . . [and learn to] interpret certain conduct to indicate an
imminent attack or a more severe attack.'" Id. (quoting Crocker, The Meaning of Equality
for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 127 (1985).
" See infra notes 61-70 (discussing need for expert testimony on battering syndromes to
support defense to murder).
"' See Malkin, supra note 29, at 628. "U]uries are usually unfamiliar with domestic vio-
lence.... [Tihe use of the 'reasonable man' standard results in juries being unable to find
the abused woman's actions justifiable and reasonable." Id. Society simply does not associ-
ate violent acts with women. Id. "Some judges, prosecutors, and police officers still retain
the attitude that the woman 'asked for it,' or worse, deserved it." Id. at 627; see also Ibn-
Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 655 (D.C. 1979) (refusing to reverse lower court
decision to exclude expert testimony on battered woman syndrome because of lack of sci-
entific knowledge); Commonwealth v. Moore, 514 N.E.2d 1342, 1345 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987) (refusing to reverse lower court's decision omitting expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome because self-defense was never asserted, therefore imminence question
was irrelevant); Ensign, supra note 6, at 1625. The author notes that most people do not
know of the severe violence that occurs in abusive relationships and tend to believe that
divorce is the answer to spousal abuse problems. Id. What these people do not take into
consideration is the wife's emotional or economic dependence on her husband. Id.
See generally KERSTI YLLO, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 14 (1988). "[T]he U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare noted that children from homes where the
wife is battered are at a very high risk of receiving their father's abuse." Id. "Similar to the
battered woman scenario, battered child homicide cases receive less judicial sympathy." Id.
"Although expert testimony is extremely important in homicide defense cases, it is usually
excluded." Id. at 1640. Despite the concern and attention given to child abuse in this coun-
try, there are still instances where the system fails. Id. As with woman battering, the legal
system, and society in general, cannot rely merely on the progress made to date. Id.; Han-
sen, supra note 12, at 28. "Lawmakers and the Courts are just starting to extend to bat-
tered kids the same right to defend themselves that battered women have largely won." Id.;
Margolick, supra note 12, at D20. Although there is a present movement recognizing an
abused child's right to act in self-defense, it is "intermittent." Id.
" Ensign, supra note 6, at 1624 (discussing misconceptions about battered woman's pre-
dicament and her refusal/inability to leave). But see People v. Garcia, 54 Cal. App. 3d 61,
65-66 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976). The Garcia court noted
that since the 1970s, courts have been more amenable in allowing testimony concerning
the man's behavior and his threats to harm the woman in determining the battered wo-
man's reasonableness in her belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to avert the
threatened harm. Id.
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understood. 4 The two syndromes require expert testimony in
both to enlighten the jury as to the reasonableness of the individ-
ual's perception of imminent danger.56
Where the threat of death or serious bodily harm is not immi-
nent, a court should, according to concepts of traditional self-de-
fense, require the woman or child to explain why he or she did
not resort to an alternative course of action before turning to vio-
lence.5 6 If there was a safe avenue of retreat available, some feel
that such an avenue should have been pursued. 57 It is also argued
that a history of battering by the now-deceased should not support
" See Moreno, supra note 34, at 1301 n.145. "Parents' actions against their children
have a strong influence because of the nature of the parent-child relationship." Id. Chil-
dren depend upon their parents for all their needs, i.e., survival, affection, attention and
" 'an understanding of what the world in which they live is all about.' " Id. (quoting Ellen
Bass, Introduction to I NEVER TOLD ANYONE: WRITINGS BY WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE 23, 26-27 (E. Bass & L. Thornton eds., 1983)); see also Gardner, supra note 6, at
984-85 nn.254-55. Agencies designed to protect children often did not prosecute child
abusers, which spurred Congress to enact reporting laws. Id. n.254. In addition, many
states such as Arkansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Pennsylva-
nia, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia have enacted similar statutes requiring that
any suspicion of child abuse be reported to the appropriate authorities. Id. These states
require that suspicion of child abuse be reported directly to the District Attorney's office
and/or medical examiner or coroner. Id. at 985 n.255; Karla 0. Boresi, Comment, Syn-
drome Testimony in Child Abuse Prosecutions: The Wave of the Future?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 207, 209 (1989). Although expert testimony is not "automatically admissible," re-
cently it seems that more courts are permitting such evidence, at least to rebut the sugges-
tion that the injuries to the child were accidental. Id. The battered child syndrome tends to
stand up to the requirement of scientific certainty and does not unfairly prejudice the de-
fendant. Id. at 213. The syndrome has been determined to be a reliable scientific concept,
and thus is usually admitted into court. Id. (citations omitted).
" See Ensign, supra note 6, at 1624 (discussing similarities between two syndromes and
how expert testimony needed in both); see also State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio
1990). "Expert testimony would be essential to rebut the general misconceptions regarding
battered women." Id.; Kit Kinports, Women on the Verge, A.B.A. J., Nov., 1989, at 129, 130
(reviewing LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCI-
ETY RESPONDS (1989)) (discussing need for expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
to aid in self defense claim); Rosen, supra note 4, at 39. "Among the trial tactics the cre-
ators of the battered woman's defense recommend is the careful and strategic use of lay
and expert testimony to neutralize stereotypical prejudices and ideas that may interfere
with the jury's ability to perceive the defendant's conduct as a reasonable act of self-de-
fense." Id.
" See Estrich, supra note 29, at 1433. "Is it so wrong at least to ask whether alternatives
were available? Is it unreasonable to expect that where death or serious bodily harm is not
imminent, a woman [or child] be required to explain why she did not resort to such alter-
natives before she resorts to armed violence?" Id.
" See id. at 1434 (explaining that if one can safely retreat, that, and not deadly force,
should be first option); see also Malkin, supra note 29, at 626. The author argues that unless
there is an overt aggressive act by the abuser, deadly force is not justified. Id. The author
believes imminent danger cannot be present if the abuser is asleep. Id. The abused person
had alternatives, i.e., leaving the home or seeking help, which would have avoided both a
beating and the abuser's death. Id. In short, verbal threats do not justify deadly force. Id.
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a battered person's claim of self-defense but should work against
it.58 Because the woman or child is aware that a beating is certain
to occur at some time soon, the duty to remove oneself from the
situation has increased. 9 Failure to do so should not convert a
genuine belief into imminent harm. 0
The expert can show that the circumstances the battered per-
son is forced to deal with are comparable to those of an individual
in a hostage situation: the battered person lives under long-term,
life-threatening pressures which put him or her in constant fear of
death or serious bodily injury."' The battered person fears a
threat not just when it is made, but for days, weeks, and even
months later." The determinative issue should not be whether
imminent danger should be a required element, but rather how to
interpret the imminent danger of a battering situation. The crimi-
nal justice system must look not to whether the danger was in fact
objectively imminent, but whether, given the circumstances, the
defendant had a reasonable belief that danger was imminent.63 An
expert is able to "shed light on why years of unrelenting abuse
might foster an apprehension of imminent danger in these
cases." 6 ' Specifically, with the battered woman syndrome, the ex-
" See Malkin, supra note 29, at 626 (arguing that lack of reasonableness is shown by not
removing self from obviously dangerous situation).
59 Id.
s d.
6, See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 14, at 458. The authors present a hypothetical to
illustrate the problems of the imminence requirement. Id. If the captor in a hostage situa-
tion tells the hostage that he intends to kill him in three days, and if, on the first day, the
hostage has an opportunity to kill the captor and avoid his own death, isn't he justified in
doing so? Id. Strict adherence to the imminence requirement, in effect, would prevent a
hostage from using deadly force until his captor is actually attacking him. Id. For the bat-
tered woman, the situation is analogous. Id. She sees no escape and does not feel safe. Id.
She fears the next attack, and unless she resorts to deadly force, another beating is una-
voidable. Id. Thus, a battered woman perceives the threat as imminent. Id.; see also Suh,
supra note 7, at 63. The battering relationship is comparable to torture. Id. "It's a kind of
captor/captive process where he's totally controlling her life. One of the things that hap-
pen when the violence reaches terrifying levels is that you start to get depressed and numb.
It's a common survival tactic for victims of all kinds of violence ...." Id.
" See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 13, at 458 (discussing effects of "learned helplessness"
resulting from repeated abuse).
" See Malkin, supra note 29, at 626. "The woman [or child] obviously should not have
to wait until [his or] her attacker is already beating [him or] her before [he or] she can
resort to deadly force." Id.
" Kinports, supra note 55, at 130; see Moreno, supra note 34, at 1288. "Abused chil-
dren, like battered women, perceive the behavior of their batterer with a degree of knowl-
edge and familiarity not accounted for in the rational observation standard of the self-
defense model; Rosen, supra note 4, at 34 ("The woman's fear of the man will be influ-
enced by her knowledge of his character and reputation for violence.")." Id.
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pert can explain why a woman entered into such a relationship
and why she remained despite the abuse.6 In child abuse cases,
the expert can show the reasonableness of self-defense after en-
during years of severe "emotional, physical and sexual abuse." 6
The expert's job is to make a battered woman or child's reality
available to the finder of fact, and demonstrate how his or her
actions had "purpose and logic" 1'' within the context of the hor-
ror which he or she has faced. 68 Since expert testimony is admissi-
ble if it will assist the trier of fact in search of the truth, evidence
concerning the abuse of the defendant should be admitted to eval-
uate whether the abused's actions were reasonable in light of his
or her situation. 9
The majority of courts have recognized the importance of such
testimony and have therefore admitted expert testimony on the
battering syndromes. 70 These courts have made admission contin-
gent upon the following four criteria: A) it must be "relevant and
material ' 71 to the issue of self-defense; B) the subject of the ex-
pert testimony cannot be within the common understanding of
the jury; C) the battering syndrome must be "sufficiently devel-
See WALKER, supra note 19, at 29-30 (discussing psychological inability to leave after
battering).
" Margolick, supra note 12, at Al. "Maybe we've jumped that hurdle of being able to
show to a jury and a community that a child cannot endure years and years of severe
emotional, physical and sexual abuse and not be expected to defend herself at some point."
Id.
'7 Kinports, supra note 55, at 131.
" See Malkin, supra note 29, at 627. In discussing the abusive relationship, the author
states that the abused may be acting reasonably by staying. Id. "The victim may have ex-
perienced years of isolation from family or friends imposed by the batterer. [He or s]he
often has no real support system." Id. Thus, the victim may feel as if he or she has no
where to turn. Id. The victim simply remains with the abuser and hopes things will get
better. Id. His or her self-confidence is too low for anything else. Id.
" See Blodgett, supra note 22, at 37. An expert can show that victims of domestic abuse
have a "special feeling of imminence - they have to live with the victim." Id. The author
claims that a threat that others may not reasonably perceive as imminent would reasonably
appear imminent to an abused individual. Id.
70 See People v. Smith, 387 N.W.2d 814, 816 (Mich. 1986) (stating if expert testimony
will aid factfinder or help determine facts in issue, it should be admitted); State v. Kelly,
478 A.2d 364, 379 n.13 (N.J. 1984) (holding expert testimony admissible to prove objec-
tive reasonableness of defendant's fear of danger); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 71,
349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 665, 304 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1973) (discussing how battered child syn-
drome has become "an accepted medical diagnosis"); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,
817-18 (N.D. 1983) (same); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) (discussing
how battered woman syndrome has gained acceptance as admissible evidence); State v. AI-
lery, 682 P.2d 312, 314-15 (Wash. 1984) (allowing expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome).
"' State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ohio 1981).
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oped, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge;""2
and D) "its prejudicial impact [cannot] outweigh its probative
value.""7
III. CRITERIA FOR ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Relevance
Expert testimony on battering syndromes is relevant to the issue
of whether the defendant acted in self-defense because it can ex-
plain the reasonableness of the battered person's perception that
danger or great bodily harm was imminent." The reasonableness
and imminence requirements of self-defense can only be under-
stood within the framework of the battering syndromes .7
B. Outside the Knowledge of the Jury
On its face, the expert's testimony appears to provide a jury
with common knowledge.7  Generally, a jury is able to assess the
72 Id.
73 Id.
71 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing imminence in context of bat-
tered women and children).
75 See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 373. Kelly was one of the first cases to emphasize the need for
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Id. The court found that the syndrome
was relevant to the woman's self-defense claim because it related to the issue of whether
she honestly and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger. Id. at 377; West v. State,
617 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Okla. Grim. App. 1980). A defendant must show that there was a
reasonable belief as to the imminence of great bodily harm or death and as to the force
necessary to repel it. Id. Many of the symptoms of the battered woman syndrome are very
relevant to the standard of reasonableness in self-defense, i.e., a greater sensitivity to dan-
ger stemming from the intimacy of the relationship. Id.; Price v. State, 98 P. 447, 459
(Okla. Grim. App. 1908). The Price court held that "[w]hat is or is not an overt demonstra-
tion of violence varies with the circumstances." Id. Thus, considering the battered woman's
particular circumstances, her perception of the situation and her belief as to the imminence
of great bodily harm or death may be deemed reasonable. d.; WALKER, supra note 19, at
31-55. The defendant's particular experiences as a battered woman affect the reasonable-
ness of her perceptions of danger and its imminence, and of the necessary actions to pro-
tect herself. Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 12, at 28. "In a battering case ... the defense
tries to show how an abusive relationship can affect the battered victim's perceptions of
what constitutes an imminent threat." Id. In Washington, a boy who shot his father as he
walked through the front door was permitted to argue self-defense at trial, providing the
jury with the task of evaluating whether the defendant's perception of imminency was rea-
sonable. Id.
76 See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990). "The difficulty with the expert's
testimony is that it sounds as if an expert is giving knowledge to ajury about something the
jury knows as well as anyone else, namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of immi-
nent serious danger." Id. But see Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (expert testimony aids jury in evaluating case); State v. Gunter, 554 A.2d 1356, 1363
(N.J. 1988) (battering relationship embodies features beyond "the jury's ken"); State v.
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reasonableness of a person's fear of imminent danger." However,
such expert testimony is aimed at a special area of knowledge with
which the jury is likely to be uninformed. 8 In fact, the average
person is unfamiliar with the complex behavior of a victim in-
volved in a battering relationship and has many misconceptions as
to the options available to the abused.7 9 Therefore, if an expert
testifies to the pressures the woman or child endures, a jury will
better comprehend the situation." Hence, expert testimony en-
ables the jury to put aside "prior conclusions" and to dispel "com-
King, 522 A.2d 455, 461 (N.J. 1987) (admitting expert testimony if subject matter is "be-
yond the ken of the average juror"); Estrich, supra note 29, at 1436 (expert testimony is
only admissible if expert has "special knowledge" about something jury does not).
"' See Cipparone, supra note 17, at 434. "In many situations, the circumstances under
which a battered woman killed her batterer will have been such that she will have little
difficulty satisfying the traditional self-defense standard." Id.; see also Estrich, supra note
29, at 1436 (expert testimony is admissible when subject beyond average knowledge of
jury).
78 See People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
Cty. 1985). "ITihis determination that the subject matter of the battered woman is one
outside of the common knowledge of the trier of fact is in line with a recent trend of
decisions receiving in evidence expert testimony concerning similarly complex psychologi-
cal and social phenomena." Id. In short, the court found that the average layman has many
misconceptions regarding available options to a victim of abuse. Id. at 135, 488 N.Y.S.2d at
362; see also Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (proponents of
expert testimony contend that jurors suffer from various misconceptions); State v. Hen-
num, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989) (expert testimony can "dispel the common mis-
conceptions that a normal or reasonable person would not remain in such an abusive rela-
tionship"); Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 969 (Pa. 1991) (Cappy, J., concurring)
(discussing necessity of expert testimony to dispel myths regarding battered women).
"' See Tourlakis, 738 F. Supp. at 1134 ("learned helplessness" beyond ken of most ju-
rors); Torres, 128 Misc. 2d at 133, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (expert testimony allows jury to
understand unique pressures in life of battered woman); Dillon, 598 A.2d at 966 (Nix, C.J.,
concurring) ("expert testimony can be introduced to show how battering relationship gen-
erates different perspectives"); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986) (testimony
relevant to explain why women remain in abusive relationship); Moreno, supra note 34, at
1304. The author discusses child abuse as being "an extremely complex problem." Id.
There are common misconceptions involving abused children. Id. at 1304-05. When the
children try to seek help and confide in the non-abusing parent, they are usually "told that
they are 'lying' or 'making it up.' " Id. at 1305. "The children are left 'feeling hopeless and
uncared for.' " Id. quoting Brandt Steele, Psychodynamic Factors in Child Abuse, in THE BAT-
TERED CHILD 81, 84 (R. Helfer & R. Kempe eds., 1987). Expert witnesses can explain these
pressures to the jury. Id. at 1306.
80 See Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974 (expert testimony assists trier of fact in determining if
defendant acted out of honest fear of imminent danger); see also Tourlakis, 738 F. Supp. at
1134 (expert testimony provides reasons why battered women perceive imminent danger);
State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (testimony determines if de-
fendant acted out of honest belief of imminent danger); Hansen, supra note 12, at 28. In a
murder case, the defense will frequently attempt to show how an abusive wife-husband or
child-parent relationship can influence the battered person's views of what actually is an
imminent threat. Id.
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mon myths" in order to reach a decision on the merits.8'
C. Accepted Scientific Knowledge
Since the late 1970s, many books and articles have been written
on both the battered woman syndrome and the battered child syn-
drome.8" Knowledge of the battering syndromes has surpassed
theory and has been classified in the medical profession as a valid
disorder.8 Most courts that have dealt with these issues have held
that the syndromes have gained substantial scientific acceptance in
order to warrant admissibility. 4
81 Torres, 128 Misc. 2d at 133, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (expert enables jury to disregard
prior conclusions and myths); Kitchens v. McKay, 528 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (expert testimony aids trier of fact in search of truth); see also FED. R. EvI 702. "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." Id.; Ensign, supra note 6, at 1641. "Because an average juror cannot appre-
ciate the dynamics involved in a battering relationship, expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome and the battered child syndrome will assist the trier of fact." Id.
82 See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987) (describing battered
woman syndrome); CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL (1987) (describing bat-
tered woman syndrome); WALKER, supra note 19, at 11-69 (same); see also ROBERTA KALMAR,
CHILD ABUSE: PERSPECTIVES ON DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION (1977) (same); BAR-
BARA J. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE (1984) (same); NIGEL PARTON, THE POLIT-
ICS OF CHILD ABUSE (1985) (discussing alternative child abuse ideologies); Stephen Antler,
The Rediscovery of Child Abuse, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 39
(Leroy H. Pelton ed., 1981) (discussing battered child syndrome); Edward Zigler, Control-
ling Child Abuse: Do We Have the Knowledge and/or the Will?, in CHILD ABUSE 3 (George
Gerbner et al. eds., 1980) (discussing battered child syndrome).
83 See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text (discussing medical determinations and
definitions of battering syndromes).
84 See, e.g., People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d 681, 686, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 977 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx Cty. 1992). The Burton court stated that the field of knowledge in both the "abused
child syndrome" and the "battered woman's syndrome" was sufficiently classified and de-
veloped to be "an apt subject for judicial notice." Id.; Torres, 128 Misc. 2d at 135, 488
N.Y.S.2d at 363. "Upon careful reflection and analysis .. .it is the opinion of this court
that the theory underlying the battered woman's syndrome has indeed passed beyond the
experimental stage and gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admis-
sibility." Id. The Torres court noted that many articles and books have been published on
the syndrome and recent findings of researchers have confirmed its presence. Id.; Koss, 551
N.E.2d at 974. The Koss court held that "the battered woman syndrome has gained sub-
stantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility." Id.; State v. Turner, 675 P.2d 539,
539 (Utah 1983) (battered child syndrome found widely accepted in medical field); see also
Ensign, supra note 6, at 1637. The present trend has dictated that the testimony be admit-
ted. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized at least five books and almost 70
scientific articles and papers about the battered woman syndrome. Id. at 1638. Thus, the
syndrome had a sufficient scientific basis to produce reasonably reliable results. Id. at 1635.
Acceptance is granted by the scientific community when the evidence is sufficient to deter-
mine its reliability. Id. at 1634.
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D. Probative Value v. Prejudicial Impact
Since jurors often view the expert witness as a highly educated
individual in his or her field, they often tend to view such testi-
mony as infallible. 5 Also, evidence concerning the abuse endured
by the defendant may divert the jury's attention from the relevant
issues to the prior bad acts and alleged bad character of the
abuser. 86 Thus, trial courts must carefully consider the undue
prejudicial effects that may result by admitting expert testimony.8 7
To deter the jury from focusing on the deceased's wrongdoings,
an expert is not allowed to give an opinion regarding whether the
victim actually suffered from the syndrome. 88 The only admissible
testimony is a scientific definition of the syndrome and its symp-
toms.8 9 Courts have held that an expert cannot state whether the
See Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 978 (Holmes, J., concurring). Judge Holmes warned that
"[i]mbued with the 'aura of infallibility' typically ascribed to expert witnesses, and benefit-
ing from the tendency of scientific testimony to be exceptionally persuasive, the effect of
the expert's testimony could be to enhance the relevance of conclusions that are not ger-
mane to a claim of lawful justification." Id.; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expert testimony has aura of infallibility); State v.
Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665, 666 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (testimony's prejudicial impact out-
weighs probative value); John R.T. Mitchell, Book Note, 16 URB. LAW. 527, 527 (1984)
(reviewing PETER B. DORRAM, THE EXPERT WITNESS (1984)). An oft-called expert witness
once stated that an expert witness is "someone who commands a cash price for his services
because of an ability to wow his audience - usually a selected audience of twelve good
people." Id.
" See Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 977 (diverting juror's attention presents real danger of abuse
of system); see also Mihajlovich, supra note 7, at 1274. "The effect of the battered woman's
testimony is to emphasize the defendant's weakness and helplessness, overshadowing the
battered woman's right to defend herself." Id. Jurors tend to perceive her as the victim,
not the deceased. Id.
87 See Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 977 ("caution[ing] trial courts to carefully weigh prejudicial
impact of such expert testimony").
" See State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989). In Hennum, the court per-
mitted expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome, but only in a narrow context.
Id. The court distinguished between expert testimony concerning the battered woman syn-
drome in general, and testimony regarding whether the defendant actually suffered from
the syndrome. Id. The court did not allow expert testimony regarding the defendant's con-
dition. Id.; see also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (testi-
mony cannot be used to explain defendant's belief in need to defend self and actions
taken). But see State v. Myers, 570 A.2d 1260, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1990) (existence and
impact of battered woman syndrome appropriate subject of testimony); Commonwealth v.
Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 970 (Pa. 1991) (testimony permits jury to review evidence rationally
and without prejudice); see also People v. Draper, 468 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Mich. 1991)
(same); (expert testimony limited to characteristics of an abused child); People v. Beckley,
456 N.W.2d 391, 407 (Mich. 1990).
8 See, e.g., Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 799 (expert may only testify to description of general
syndrome and characteristics of individual suffering from such syndrome); see also Draper,
468 N.W. 2d at 903 (same); (testimony in abuse cases is limited to characteristics of an
abused child); Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 407.
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defendant actually is an abused woman or child,90 but only
whether the defendant's behavior is characteristic of an abuse vic-
tim. 1 Consequently, issues of the abused's credibility go to the
jury untainted by biases created by overreliance on the expert.92
Because expert testimony on battered woman and child syn-
dromes generally satisfies the four requisite criteria, it is often ad-
mitted to assist the trier of fact in its determination of self-de-
fense.93 However, new "victimization" defenses have emerged in
recent years which have not yet reached that level of accepted sci-
entific knowledge.94 Among these, post-partum depression and
acute grief syndrome are most noteworthy.95
IV. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AS APPLIED TO POST PARTUM
DEPRESSION AND ACUTE GRIEF SYNDROME
As the law began to recognize that some individuals who com-
'0 See Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 407 (testimony is limited to behavior traits of an abused
person); Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 779 (expert not allowed to testify as to whether defend-
ant suffered from syndrome).
" See Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 407. Expert testimony was limited to an explanation of the
behavior traits at issue. Id. The court held that the expert could not testify as to the credi-
bility of the child. Id. at 409; see also People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 443 (I1. Ct. App.
1990) (expert cannot testify as to credibility of child victim); Draper, 468 N.W.2d at 903
(psychologist opinion limited to characteristics of abused child, not whether child-defend-
ant was abused); Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 799 (expert testimony limited to characteristics of
an abused woman and no testimony allowed as to whether defendant was an abused
woman).
" See People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that it is for
jury to decide credibility issue without overreliance on expert testimony).
93 See, e.g., State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ohio 1990). "Where evidence establishes
that a woman is a battered woman, and when an expert is qualified to testify about the
battered woman syndrome, expert testimony concerning the syndrome may be admitted to
assist the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant acted in self-defense." Id.;
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (admitting expert testimony
on battering syndrome); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 655 (D.C. 1979)
(same); see also Hansen, supra note 12, at 28. An appellate court in the state of Washington
held that evidence that the defendant had been consistently abused by his stepfather
should be admitted to allow the jury to evaluate whether the defendant's actions were rea-
sonable with respect to his fears of imminency. Id.; Margolick, supra note 12, at D20. As a
result of a new Texas law permitting a defendant accused of killing a family member to
introduce evidence of prior abuse, the juries in Texas often hear "chilling" stories of bat-
tering incidents. Id.
I See infra notes 111-14 & 137-40 and accompanying text (discussing why post partum
depression and acute grief syndrome are not accepted in medical field).
" See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 781 S.W.2d 510, 511 (Ky. 1989) (defendant
found guilty but mentally ill after asserting post partum depression as defense to murder of
her child by suffocation and disposal of body in lake); Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d
473, 474 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (defendant found guilty but mentally ill after asserting post
partum depression as defense to murder of her son by dropping him in stream).
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mitted crimes were not fully responsible for their actions, an in-
sanity defense emerged." States developed guidelines and stan-
dards to aid in the determination of the sanity or insanity of a
defendant.97 The McNaughten" and the American Law Institute
(ALl) tests99 are the two models most frequently incorporated into
state penal statutes."' To be proven legally insane pursuant to the
McNaughten test, it must be shown that the defendant, due to a
defect of reason or disease of the mind, either did not realize the
nature and quality of his or her actions or if he or she did, did not
know that it was wrong.'O According to the ALl test, a defendant
is legally insane if, at the time of the criminal behavior, the de-
fendant lacked the capacity to either appreciate the criminality of
his or her conduct or to conform that conduct to the require-
ments of the law.' In recent years, attempts at employing these
" See Gardner, supra note 6, at 968-77 (discussing emergence of insanity defense under
McNaughten and American Law Institute tests); see also Brusca, supra note 6, at 1149-59
(same).
' See infra note 100 and accompanying text (insanity defense in various jurisdictions).
"8 See Gardner, supra note 6, at 967. The McNaughten test has been stated as follows: to
establish a defense on the grounds of insanity,
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.
Id.
" See Brusca, supra note 6, at 1154-55.
A number of jurisdictions have adopted the rule of the American Law Institute
(ALl) Model Penal Code, which combines and refines the earlier insanity test. This
test excuses criminal conduct which results from a mental disease or defect if the
defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality, or wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform such conduct to the requirements of law.
Id.; see also AMER. LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE, art 4. § 4.01 (Mental Disease or
Defect Excluding Responsibility).
'" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (1975) (adopting ALl Model Penal Code); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.47.020 (1982) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1987) (same); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1990) (same); see also DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 401 (1982)
(adopting McNaughten test); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.14 (West 1974) (same); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 30.05(1) (McKinney 1975) (adopting both McNaughten and ALl tests).
, See Brusca, supra note 6, at 1149-59 (discussing McNaughten test).
102 See Gardner, supra note 6, at 973-76. The author discussed a case decided pursuant
to the ALl test where the mother "snapped" and killed her three-month old infant by
throwing him on the floor and fracturing his skull. Id. at 973. Although the testifying
expert stated that the defendant was not schizophrenic and did know right from wrong,
(which would have resulted in conviction if the McNaughten test was applied), she was suf-
fering from a mental dysfunction rendering her incapable of conforming her conduct to
the law. Id. at 973-74. As a result, her acquittal was affirmed. Id. at 974. The author also
noted that since conviction or acquittal depends on a number of factors, including which
insanity test the state adopts, the form of expert testimony given, or the severity with
which the person is afflicted, consistent decisions are not possible. Id. at 976.
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tests in cases involving dubious conditions have presented trouble-
some questions for the courts.
A. Post Partum Depression
In the 1980s, post partum depression began to emerge as a pos-
sible defense for a mother who murdered her infant child.1"' Post
partum depression alters the personality of the mother and causes
her to become depressed.1 'O The symptoms and seriousness of the
effects vary among women. 0 5 Thus, post partum depression has
been distinguished and categorized according to its various de-
grees of severity.110 The mildest and most common form is re-
ferred to as the "baby blues," where the mother experiences a
period of minor emotional letdown.10 7 The secondary category is
called post partum depression in which the mother becomes genu-
inely depressed.0 The most severe and rare form is termed post
partum psychosis and is exemplified by a serious emotional
dysfunction."9
103 See State v. Barsness, 473 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (expert allowed to
testify regarding symptoms of post partum depression); State v. Holden, 365 S.E.2d 626,
628 (N.C. 1988) (expert could testify as to whether defendant suffered from post partum
depression); State v. Daniel, 354 S.E.2d 216, 217 (N.C. 1987) (post partum depression is
mitigating factor for sentencing). See generally BLACK'S LAw DiCrIONARY 778 (6th ed. 1990).
Infanticide is the murder or killing of an infant soon after birth. Id. The fact of the birth
distinguishes it from "feticide" or "procuring abortion," which is the destruction of the
fetus in the womb. Id.
104 See Grossman, supra note 6, at 312-13 (discussing depression felt by new mothers).
105 See infra notes 107-09 (discussing levels and categories of post partum depression).
104 See id.
10 Brusca, supra note 6, at 1133 n.3. "The 'baby blues' is a fleeting period of emotional
letdown, in which the new mothers become sensitive, moody and tearful." Id. Between 50
and 80% of all new mothers suffer from the "blues" after giving birth. Id. at n.2.
'" See id. at 1134 n.3. Post partum depression, the second category, is more severe than
the baby blues. Id. at 1142. It affects 10 to 15% of all mothers. Id. In this phase, "involun-
tary tears turn into a genuine sadness and other symptoms of depression." Id. at 1143.
This category "is characterized by irritability, anxiety, fatigue, lack of love for the child,
and a sense of guilt and inadequacy related to the inability to function as a mother." Id.
'09 See id. at 1144. Post partum psychosis is the most severe of the three categories and
occurs in only one or two deliveries out of every thousand. Id. The mother suffers from
"confusion, delirium, hallucinations, insomnia, emotional lability, fatigue and irritability."
Id. More severe symptoms may also occur. Id.
The mother may exhibit an atypical or brief reactive psychosis .... She often has
difficulty coping with the care of the infant and may appear confused, bewildered,
perplexed and dreamy, complaining of poor memory although performing normally
in formal memory tests. Classically she shows signs of psychotic depression with ma-
nic or schizophrenic features and some cognitive impairment that suggests an or-
ganic disorder of the brain . . . . Excessive concern with the baby's health, guilt
about lack of love, and delusions about the infant's being dead or defective are com-
mon. She may deny having given birth or report hallucinations that command her to
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There are several theories concerning the cause of post partum
depression, but to date, none have been substantiated as fact.' 10
The predominant hypothesis is that the radical change in a wo-
man's hormone level after pregnancy causes the mood fluctua-
tions.11 Others suggest that it is a "hormonally assisted grief reac-
tion that occurs predominantly in women who have expectations
of pregnancy and delivery which are not met.""' Yet, others sug-
gest that sociological, psychological, and biological factors, acting
either separately or in conjunction, cause post partum
depression."'
B. Acute Grief Syndrome
Acute grief syndrome results from the trauma of extreme emo-
tional stress which affects the mental operation of the mind."
4
The extreme stress may be caused by a variety of experiences
such as a death in the family, involvement in an accident, or other
similar events." 5 Those claiming to suffer from acute grief syn-
drome contend that due to the level of stress they have encoun-
tered, their actions were not the result of a rational mind and thus
warrant the protection of the insanity defense." 6
harm the baby.
Id.
no See infra notes 111-13 (discussing possible causes of post partum depression).
"' See Grossman, supra note 6, at 970 n.76. "The withdrawal of hormones following the
delivery of the placenta is believed to be the main contributor to [post partum depres-
sion]." Id.
"I Id. at n.77. Factors such as the woman's attitude toward her pregnancy, whether the
pregnancy was planned or not, the mother's degree of narcissism, or vulnerability have
been suggested as potential contributors. Id.
"' See Gardner, supra note 6, at 956-57 (discussing various factors which may contribute
to post partum depression).
14 See People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d 681, 683, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
Cty. 1992). The acute grief syndrome is caused by trauma attendant upon circumstances of
extreme stress. Id. It is the mental operation of the mind produced by emotional stress
which affects human behavioral patterns. Id. In Burton, the defendant confessed to murder-
ing his mother, and, at his trial, tried to introduce expert testimony on the acute grief
syndrome to show that he confessed because of the stress that he was under. Id. The de-
fendant argued that factors' contributing to his stress were his young age, discovering his
mother's body, coping with her death, and his father's absence from New York during the
ordeal. Id. In addition, the defendant asserted duress as he was isolated from his loved ones
while at the police station and was threatened to be charged with the statutory rape of his
girlfriend if he did not confess to the murder. Id. The defense concluded that the acute
grief which the defendant was forced to deal with manifested a traumatized psychological
state which caused him to confess to a crime he did not commit. Id.
See id. (describing situations where there may be extreme stress causing acute grief).
11 See id. In Burton, the defendant contended that "evidence [of acute grief syndrome]
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C. Failure Under the Present Insanity Standards
In most instances, one suffering from post partum depression or
acute grief syndrome will not be able to sufficiently prove insanity
under the present standards. " ' As mentioned, the McNaughten
test requires that a defendant not know that his or her conduct
was wrong.1 1 8 Courts have held that when a defendant tries to
hide his or her crime by fabricating a story, there is an inference
of sanity. " 9 Judges tend to interpret concealment and denial as
proof of the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong; and since
most mothers who kill their babies try to hide their crime, failing
to meet the standards of the McNaughton test is inevitable. 20
has potential to assist the jury and should, with adequate instruction, nonetheless be tested
through cross-examination and countervailing expert testimony." Id. at 691, 590 N.Y.S.2d
at 978. However, the court rejected this contention for two reasons. Id. First, it did not
meet the prevailing New York standard of scientific reliability, and second, the testimony
was not necessary since it tracts the same process which the jury is fully capable of under-
standing, such as determining the witness's credibility. Id.; People v. Shelton, 88 Misc. 2d
136, 141-46, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. 1976), affid, 78 A.D.2d 821,
434 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1st Dep't 1980). In Shelton, the defendant asserted extreme emotional
distress as a defense to murder charges. Id. at 141, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 712. The court noted
that extreme emotional disturbance is an emotional state of an individual who has no
mental disease or defect rising to the level established by insanity defense statutes. Id. at
146, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 716. An individual who is extremely emotionally disturbed due to
exposure to an extremely unusual amount of stress tends to lose self-control and reason. Id.
at 141, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 712. He or she is overcome by intense feelings, such as passion,
anger, distress, and grief. Id. In these cases, expert testimony has been found to be relevant
and material, although not controlling, since the jury may reject the defense offered by the
expert. Id. at 146, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 715. However, it should be noted that although emo-
tional distress evidence was admitted, it was done so only as a mitigating factor and not as
support for an insanity defense. Id. at 141-46, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 712-15. In fact, it is listed as
an affirmative defense under subdivision 1(a) of section 125.25 of the New York Penal
Law, which as a "mitigating circumstance," would reduce the murder conviction to man-
slaughter in the first degree. Id.
317 See Brusca, supra note 6, at 1166 n.205 (discussing problem presented by temporary
nature of post partum depression); see also People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 443 (IIl. Ct.
App. 1990) (noting several obstacles which impede use of such defenses); Burton, 153 Misc.
2d at 686, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 977. In Burton, the defendant failed to meet the standards of
admitting evidence on the "acute grief syndrome." Id. "[Tihe field of knowledge relating
to 'acute grief syndrome' has neither sufficiently been classified nor developed to be an apt
subject for judicial notice." Id. But see Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 781 S.W.2d 510, 511
(Ky. 1989) (defendant found guilty but mentally ill after asserting post partum depression
as defense to murder of her child); Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473, 474 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987) (defendant found guilty but mentally ill after asserting post partum de-
pression as defense to murder of her son).
"8 See supra note 98 (discussing McNaughten test).
19 See Gardner, supra note 6, at 970 (discussing standards of determining insanity).
120 See State v. Holden, 365 S.E.2d 626, 630 (N.C. 1988). "[E]vidence of planning,
weighing of options, and covering her own tracks tended to negate defendant's claim that
she was unable to appreciate her situation or the nature of her conduct." Id.; Dahmer Di-
lemma, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 24, 1992, at 16. "By all accounts, [Dahmer] knew exactly what he
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The predominant test for insanity under the ALI is whether the
defendant can conform his or her conduct to the law.12' There-
fore, if a defendant is able to refrain from his or her delusional
urges to harm others in the presence of bystanders, he or she is
presumed able to conform to and abide by the law.1"2 Since post-
partum depression and acute grief syndrome are temporary, and
allege an inability to control behavior only during the crime,
there will likely be a finding of capability to conform conduct to
the law. 23 Therefore, it seems the only way to provide a valid
defense for these defendants is to expand the present concept of
insanity to include guidelines which would serve to exculpate
them.
However, such an expansion would contradict the evolution of
the insanity defense in criminal law.' 2 4 The more stringent stan-
dards now utilized are a result of reforms made to the insanity
defense.' 25 For example, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984 placed a larger burden on a defendant asserting insanity by
completely removing the volitional aspect of the ALI standard,
and requiring the defendant prove his or her insanity by "clear
and convincing evidence.""' Some states have even abolished the
was doing, and his attempts at covering up his atrocities are evidence of someone in control
of at least a good part of his faculties." Id.; see also State v. White, 456 P.2d 797, 798
(Idaho 1969). In Comitz, the defendant mother did not admit dropping her child into a
stream, but contended that he was kidnapped. Id. The court found that even if the defend-
ant was suffering from post partum depression, she was aware that her actions would cause
harm or death to her son. Id. at 800. Such a finding is detrimental to an insanity defense
under the McNaughten standard as it substantiates knowledge of right and wrong. Id.
See supra notes 99 & 102 and accompanying text (discussing ALI test).
12 See State v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59, 66 (Neb. 1980) (Clinton, J., dissenting). "Guilty
knowledge may be inferred from the defendant's denials as well as from the concealment
and burying of the child." Id. But see People v. Skeoch, 96 N.E.2d 473, 473-74 (Ill. 1951).
A defendant-mother's conviction of murder for suffocating her six-day old son by tieing a
plastic diaper around his neck was reversed for failure to admit evidence of post partum
depression. Id.; Grossman, supra note 6, at 335. This author discusses a California case
where the judge overturned a lower court's murder conviction of a defendant-mother who
ran over her six-week old son and then dumped his body in a garbage can. Id. Upon retrial
she was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Id.
" See infra notes 145-49 (discussing temporary nature of post partum depression and
acute grief syndrome).
See infra notes 126-28 (discussing reforms made to insanity defense).
" See Grossman, supra note 6, at 312 n.5. Since the attempted assassination of President
Reagan by John Hinckley, the insanity defense has been criticized and re-evaluated. Id.; see
also Gardner, supra note 6, at 977-78. The Hinckley acquittal resulted in reforms to the
insanity defense. Id. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 was a result of public out-
rage at Hinckley's acquittal. Id. at 978.
"" See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986). The new Act refined and narrowed the ALl test.
Id. The Act provides:
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insanity defense completely and contend that an insane person
should be held accountable for his or her criminal behavior.
121
Therefore, since efforts have been directed at curbing the insanity
defense, alterations to suit the needs of a post partum depression
or acute grief victim would directly contradict the current state of
the law.128
D. Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The admission of expert testimony on post partum depression
and acute grief syndrome is not feasible under present stan-
dards.129 Unlike the battered woman and child syndromes, post
(a) Affirmative Defense.-It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any
federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the of-
fense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of Proof.-The defendant has the burden of proving the Defense of
insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. The Act further limits the insanity defense by amending Rule 704 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which now provides:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a de-
fendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the de-
fendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the
trier of the fact alone.
FED. R. EvID. 705; Therefore an expert can no longer make a judgment as to whether the
defendant is legally insane. Id.
"' See Gardner, supra note 6, at 978. Some states, including Idaho, Montana, and Utah,
have gone as far as abolishing the insanity defense. Id.; see also Stephen M. Glynn, If
Dahmer's Not Crazy, Who Is?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 13 (stating that mentally insane
person can still be responsible for his acts).
"' See Gardner, supra note 6, at 983-85. Child protection has become extremely impor-
tant, as exemplified by the passing of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act by
Congress in 1974. Id. This Act gave national recognition to child abuse by allocating funds
for state use in research and prevention measures. Id. It also created the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect. Id. In 1984, in response to rising child abuse statistics, Con-
gress passed amendments to its 1974 Act which required the states to enact child abuse
reporting statutes. Id. However, many incidents of child abuse are still not reported. Id. To
allow post partum depression to support a defense to the murder of one's child would
contradict congressional efforts to curb child abuse. Id.; see also People v. Burton, 153
Misc. 2d 681, 683, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1992). The Burton court
held that the "acute grief syndrome" has not made a "clear and convincing showing that
its reliability enjoys any requisite standing and/or scientific recognition among the particu-
lar field of psychiatric or psychological authorities to allow expert testimony on its conse-
quences," clearly following the trend to curb novel mental defects used as defenses to mur-
der. Id.
2 See People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that ad-
missibility of expert testimony depends on whether information is necessary and helpful to
trier of fact); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-800 (Minn. 1989) (asserting that
expert testimony must be outside knowledge and experience of jury and must add preci-
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partum depression and acute grief syndrome have failed to meet
the requirements of reliability and scientific acceptance set by to-
day's courts.130 Although defendants often try to introduce expert
testimony on these mental conditions, they are without sufficient
reliability to sanction their use in the courtroom.13t
sion or depth to jury's ability to reach conclusion about subject); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d
970, 972 (Ohio 1990) (citing as requirements for admissibility: relevance and materiality to
self-defense, outside knowledge of jury, commonly accepted scientific knowledge, and pro-
bative value outweighing prejudicial impact). But see FED. R. EVID. 702. "If scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Id.Igo See Brusca, supra note 7, at 1140. The legal system relies upon the American Psychi-
atric Association's publication of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders to de-
termine "general acceptance" in the medical profession. Id. Since there are numerous
medical opinions as to the causes of post partum depression and a general lack of knowl-
edge concerning the disorder, the medical field has not classified post partum depression as
a "bona fide disorder." Id. As a result, courts are hesitant to admit such evidence. Id.;
Burton, 153 Misc. 2d at 686, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77: "[U]nlike 'rape trauma syndrome' ..
• or 'sexually abused child syndrome' . . .or 'battered woman's syndrome' . . . or 'battered
child syndrome' ..., the field of knowledge relating to 'acute grief syndrome' has neither
sufficiently been classified nor developed to be an apt subject for judicial notice" nor has
there been any convincing showing that its reliability receives any scientific recognition to
allow expert testimony on its consequences. Id. at 686, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 977. Further, there
is "no proof to assume that it enjoys a foundation outside the courtroom to be accepted
inside it." Id. The court maintained that there can be "little doubt" that the theory is just
an abstraction that has not received any significant support other than the claim of its
proponent. Id. Instead, there must be some type of theoretical framework formulative of
the expert's hypothesis and an adherence to scientific investigation. Id. The court con-
cluded that the proffered evidence on the syndrome was unsupported and that any scien-
tific method minimizing the possibility of jury bias was lacking. Id. The only support for
the syndrome was general diagnostic textbooks, as opposed to specialized literature, re-
ports, workshops, or validated data. Id. As a result, if such testimony were admitted, there
would be reliance on an informally classified psychiatric condition which lacks diagnostic
criteria and clarity and which contains a "breadth of inferences it presupposes to predict as
consequences without corresponding verification of its premise." Id.; see also Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1018-20 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring "general acceptance in the medi-
cal field" of illness before expert testimony can be given).
"' See Burton, 153 Misc. 2d at 688, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 978. "[E]xperts .. .would not,
indeed do not, deem this theory beyond the realm of isolated speculation without a level of
reliability sufficient to warrant its use in the courtroom." Id. But see id. at 682, 590
N.Y.S.2d at 973. There is debate as to whether scientific evidence, such as testimony ex-
plaining human behavior, should receive a special approach, that is, a more liberal stan-
dard. Id. The defendants argued that because psychiatry is accepted in the field of
medicine, testimony on the acute grief syndrome should also be accepted. Id. They asserted
that explanatory testimony was relevant because it would aid the jury in making its own
determination as to whether the opinion was reliable. Id. In short, the theory's success as a
defense should depend on the weight the jury gives to it and not its admissibility. Id.; see
also People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 282, 288, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135 522 N.Y.S.2d 883, 887
(1990). In Taylor, the majority stated that New York courts have allowed expert testimony
where it was needed to "help ... clarify an issue calling for professional or technical
knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of a typical juror." Id. (citation
1992)
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It is conceded that the exclusion of evidence of a pertinent
mental condition impedes a defendant's right to present an effec-
tive defense." 2 Thus, certain biological and psychological factors
which alter a person's mental operation are relevant to an insanity
defense, and expert testimony on these conditions should be ad-
missible. However, this is assuming that the defendant's mental
state is deemed to be outside the realm of jury knowledge since
only evidence beyond a jury's everyday experience is allowed via
expert testimony."' Even if post partum depression and acute
grief syndrome were considered outside the knowledge of the
jury, this alone'is insufficient to warrant their admissibility.""
Enough must be known about the conditions to enable a court to
reach a definitive conclusion on the defendant's state of mind.135
If the syndromes are scientifically accepted, their probative value
would outweigh their prejudicial impact, warranting admissibility.
However, if evidence of these conditions is not sufficiently devel-
oped in the scientific community, there is great potential for ju-
rors to place a degree of overreliance on the expert and the testi-
mony he is giving, however unreliable it may be.' At this time,
the medical field cannot agree on the causes of post partum de-
omitted); Gardner, supra note 7, at 970-72 (discussing the theories that abound as to the
cause of post-partum depression).
"I See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 (1973) (discussing unconstitutionality
of mandated exclusion of relevant mental condition); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
18 (1967) (same).
"' See People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 437, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1351, 418 N.Y.S.2d
371, 374 (1979). Expert testimony is inadmissible on any issue which is within the knowl-
edge of the jury. Id. "It is always within the sole province of the jury to decide whether the
testimony of any witness is truthful or not. The jurors are fully capable of using their
ordinary experience to test the credibility of the victim-witness." Id.
134 See supra notes 72-88 (discussing requirements for admissibility of expert testimony).
13 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). "Just when a scientific
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define . . . . [T]he thing . . . must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
'" See Burton, 153 Misc. 2d at 684, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 978. When scientific evidence is
novel, special challenges are presented. Id. 684, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 978. There are great risks
in admitting untrustworthy opinions since the jury can be misled by the seemingly superior
knowledge with which they are presented. Id. As a result of this "aura of certainty," they
may tend to give too much weight to the evidence when it is presented by experts with
such imposing credentials. Id. They may overestimate its probative value and overlook the
fact that the evidence is only conjectural in nature. Id. Thus, the weight of the opinion may
be over-credited without critical scrutiny. Id.; see also United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d
907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). "The effect of receiving
such testimony . . . may be two-fold; first, it may cause juries to surrender their own com-
mon sense in weighing testimony; second, it may produce a trial within a trial on what is a
collateral . . . matter." Id. at 912.
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pression or acute grief syndrome, nor can it concur that they are
mental/physical disorders. What is agreed is that "more research
is needed."'3 7 In addition, the American Psychiatric Association
does not list these disorders as diseases in and of themselves.'3 8 As
a result, post partum depression and acute grief syndrome fail the
accepted scientific knowledge requirement for admission of expert
testimony." 9
Thus, these two mental conditions are in the same scientific
stages as other disorders on which expert testimony has been held
inadmissible." 0 In People v. Williams,"' the trial judge refused to
admit the testimony of a medical expert to show that individuals
addicted to heroin are "unworthy of belief.' '1 42 Since the relevant
fields of knowledge for either mental condition have not been suf-
ficiently classified nor developed, they are not proper subjects for
judicial notice and their failure to meet the entrenched standards
of admissibility should bar their use in the courtroom. "The
courtroom is not an appropriate setting to break ground that has
not been broken in the laboratory or in the workplace.""'1 3
In re M.Z., 15 Misc. 2d 564, 578, 590 N.Y.S.2d 390, 399 (Family Ct. 1992).
See People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 634 (I1. Ct. App. 1990). The Nelson court
stated:
Many obstacles impede the recognition of post partum psychosis as a defense to
criminal homicide. Primarily, it is not fully accepted as a distinct mental illness by
the American medical and psychiatric communities. This in turn has hindered re-
search, which makes it difficult for expert psychiatric witnesses to offer conclusive
evidence regarding the syndrome's causes and effects. The illness's episodic nature
also makes it suspect. So too does its temporary duration, because by trial time, the
woman may have recovered from its effects. This presents a scenario that is some-
times too convenient for a jury to accept: a woman asks to be found not guilty be-
cause she was 'insane' at the time of the crime, but then claims she does not require
incarceration or commitment to a mental institution because she has recovered.
Id.; see also People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d 681, 682, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 n.l (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1992). "It is noted that the American Psychiatric Association does not rec-
ognize "acute grief" as a classified emotional condition or disorder." Id.
"I See supra notes 105-17 (discussing various hypotheses formulated on cause of post
partum depression and acute grief syndrome).
140 See Ciaccio, 47 N.Y. 2d at 439, 391 N.E.2d at 1351, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 375. The New
York Court of Appeals held that it was error to admit testimony by a detective that it was
"not unusual" for hijackers to act as the defendant did in this case. Id.
141 6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E. 2d 549 187 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1959).
Id. at 6 N.Y.2d at 23, 159 N.E.2d at 552, 187 N.Y.2d at 754 at 552.
Burton, 153 Misc. 2d at 686, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 977. After making an inquiry into the
"reliability of the theory of acute grief, the court . . .[found] no proof to assume that it
enjoys a foundation outside the courtroom to be accepted inside it." Id. Thus, expert testi-
mony on the syndrome was precluded. Id. "Implicit is the proposition that expert testi-
mony based on speculation devoid of factual underpinnings and/or unconfirmed by scien-
tific proof cannot form a rational basis for establishing credibility in a court of law." Id.
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E. Temporary Insanity
The temporary nature of post partum depression and acute
grief syndrome presents another obstacle to their use as a de-
fense."' A mother suffering from post partum depression will re-
turn to stability several months after giving birth."5 It appears
that one claiming to be a victim of acute grief syndrome will also
regain lucidity once the pressure of the tragedy which triggered
the grief is released." 6 An unsettling result occurs if a defendant
claims insanity and is excused from both prison time and the reha-
bilitation process usually afforded an insane defendant-it seems
that they are literally getting away with murder." 7
A possible solution lies in the acceptance of post partum depres-
sion and acute grief syndrome as evidence at trial to explain the
victim's state of mind and reducing a murder charge to man-
slaughter. Some courts have already allowed evidence of these
conditions as a mitigating factor." 8 This appears to be the only
plausible solution considering the various pitfalls in providing a
complete insanity defense: failure to pass the present insanity re-
quirements, compounded by recent attempts at curbing insanity as
a defense, lack of scientific knowledge of these conditions, and
their temporary nature.
144 See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing temporary nature of post
partum depression and acute grief syndrome).
145 See Brusca, supra note 7, at 1166 n.205 (discussing temporary nature of post partum
depression).
14 See supra notes 115-17 (discussing symptoms of acute grief syndrome).
"4 See Brusca, supra note 7, at 1166 n.205. In addition to the fact that post partum
depression is not accepted in the medical field, its temporary nature poses another obstacle
for the defendant. Id. Patients with post partum depression fluctuate between psychosis
and lucidity, making the condition difficult to diagnose. Id. For example, when a mother
murdered her child she may have been in a state of psychosis but, either before the crime
or after, she was perfectly stable. Id. The defense attorney is presented with a difficult
duality of trying to prove a temporary psychosis which is no longer a danger to anyone and
which does not warrant rehabilitative institutionalization, while simultaneously trying to
prove that the defendant was indeed insane at the time of the murder. Id. This theory may
not go over well with a jury who is faced with a deceased child and a mother who would
escape all punishment for the infant's murder. Id.
"' See id. at 1160-62 (discussing several cases where mothers suffering from post partum
depression asserted it as defense to murder of their child and received reduced conviction);
see also People v. Shelton, 88 Misc. 2d 136, 136, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 708 ( Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1976) (court allowed defendant to claim "extreme emotional disturbance" [caused
by grief] as mitigating factor in murder defense).
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CONCLUSION
To safeguard individuals who lack the requisite level of culpa-
bility, our system of criminal law has formulated specific defenses.
Both the justification defense and the insanity defense have served
to protect the innocent. As medical knowledge of specific psycho-
logical conditions develops and becomes generally accepted within
the scientific community, the criminal justice system must recog-
nize these conditions as determinative of a defendant's state of
mind, and thus his or her culpability. The law has sought to pre-
serve the rights of abuse victims by allowing expert testimony on
the battered woman and child syndromes to aid in proving a rea-
sonable belief of the presence of imminent danger. Currently, the
law is struggling to protect persons afflicted with post partum de-
pression and acute grief syndrome. However, these psychological
conditions do not fit within the confines of an insanity defense
mainly because medical knowledge of these conditions is scarce
and skepticism widespread. Further, the questionable legitimacy
of these conditions warrants placing the rights of the deceased
above the prejudicial impact of withholding such evidence. Until
post partum depression and acute grief syndrome reach the
standards of scientific acceptability set by society, expert testimony
on these mental conditions must be excluded.
Maria Massucci & James A. Pitaro
19921

